ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION by Garrett, John et al.
Technical Disclosure Commons 
Defensive Publications Series 
November 2020 




Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series 
Recommended Citation 
Garrett, John; Chen, Fang; and Bjune, Adrian, "ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION", Technical Disclosure 
Commons, (November 19, 2020) 
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3789 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Defensive Publications Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons. 
 1 6563 
ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION 
 







Presented herein is a novel machine learning approach that learns the failure 
patterns of a device and uses this information to drive automatic root case identification. 
Anomalous events can be associated with potential root causes in order to build intellectual 
capital for training future predictive automated remediation systems. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Network elements can produce hundreds of possible telemetry streams. When an 
event occurs that impacts a network element, leading indicators to the event are likely in 
just a few of the streams.  Effects from the event are also in the streams.  When operators 
examine the elements after the fact, understanding which streams are associated with the 
cause and which streams are a result of the event is not easy.  Further, extracting only the 
useful information for troubleshooting (now) and building predictive models (later) can be 
a challenge with the possible volume of data available. 
This proposal provides a novel approach for identifying root cause telemetry 
streams and patterns within hundreds of possible streams in order to build a data set for 
predictive, real time automated remediation and risk avoidance. 
The solution begins with a set of models that can be fitted and run remotely (on a 
device or within a Local Area Network (LAN)) to evaluate each telemetry stream to 
generate a single evaluation metric. This metric could be any function that produces a 
single value, such as a standard score (also known as a 'Z-Score'), distance from predicted 
or anomalous level, etc.  
During operation, each device can produce many telemetry streams. Once the 
evaluation metric for each single telemetry stream is obtained, this metric is used to 
represent the stream in the next level. There are a finite number of representations. Consider, 
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for example, three representations, identified in red, yellow, and blue, as shown below in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Data Value Streams 
For each time period, only the evaluated output is retained to represent the stream 
at that point in time (@time, t). These evaluations become a new time series. This new data 
set is evaluated by sliding a simple straddling convolutional neural network (CNN) layer 
or, more generally, a convolution layer across the time slices, as shown below in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Second 'Convolution' Layer Setup 
When the dimensionality is high, assuming there are many telemetry streams, the 
convolution layer can also be used to extract the key features from the streams. In this case, 
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a new, smaller data set of 'state transitions' is produced. This new data set, also referred to 
herein as a 'convolution set', will be much smaller and only contain streams that made a 
state transition from one time period to another.  Figure 3, below, illustrates example details 
associated with the convolution set. 
 
Figure 3: Convolution Set 
The purpose of this new layer is to develop a sequential pattern of streams that 
changed state around any single event of interest. Any telemetry stream that has a trigger 
(e.g., Anomaly, threshold) could be the 'single event of interest'.  Due to the time nature of 
the analysis, it can be inferred that streams that changed state before the alert are possible 
causes and streams that changed state after the event are effects. The entire set of state 
transitions that can be bookended by periods of non-transitions (or multiple periods if 
desired) is considered a single 'event'.  In various implementations, the length of the 
configuration time window can be set to 1-day, 3-day, and 7-day values to account for short, 
mid, and long-term effects, respectively.  Figure 4, below, illustrates example details 
associated with developing a sequential pattern of streams. 
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Figure 4: Sequential Pattern of Streams 
This identification of possible root causes and their source data is valuable for 
determining the exact cause of the event of interest. The troubleshooting can be targeted at 
these items, by bringing in the raw telemetry data, using reasoner approaches, and also 
checking for any known alerts that may be related (critical bug matching, security 
advisories, etc.). Each sequential pattern of changes over N time periods is captured as a 
'transaction' or single event, which can be used for training sequential pattern mining 
algorithms that can recognize events happening in real time. 
Consider a simple scenario involving a significant change in Media Access Control 
(MAC) address rewrites, a significant increase in traffic counters through some interfaces, 
followed by some level of resource exhaustion (e.g., processor, available bandwidth, etc.), 
followed by many other processes alarming (say processes x, y, z). In this example, the 
sequential pattern can be assembled from the state changes of all of these factors and any 
target event (say y) can have multiple sequential patterns that lead to it.  Each pattern is a 
new kind of knowledge – a record that can be used for predictive Sequential Pattern 
Matching (SPM) models as illustrated in Figure 5. 
Finally, a user feedback function can be used to identify if the root causes were 
correct, as illustrated in Figure 5, below. If so, the remediation activities are collected for 
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future automated remediation, and the record is stored to be used for predictive use cases 
where automated could trigger within the time window to prevent the issue from happening. 
A positive user feedback is used to capture a useful record for sequential pattern mining, 
as well as any metadata that may be useful for automated remediation efforts. Monitoring 
the effects returning to normal operation can be a machine 'confirmation' that the record is 
a known pattern that was corrected (once automated remediation is in place). 
 
Figure 5: Collecting User Feedback to Identify if Root Causes are Correct 
 
If root causes are not correct, this can also be reflected, and system could gather 
what data streams should have been leading indicators in order to improve the remote 
models.  In this case, the system is capable of learning from both positive and negative 
feedback and can improve accordingly. 
The root case association/identification is a proactive approach. Figure 6(a) below 
illustrates the existing workflow for anomaly detection. First, the system identify anomalies, 
but it does not have capability of automatic root cause identification, therefore, it can take 
extensive time to identify issues, which potentially may lead to system down time.  Once 
an expert fixes the issue, the problem is resolved and network up and running again.  
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In contrast, Figure 6(b) illustrates the proposed predictive system for root cause 
identification. As illustrated in Figure 6(b), once an anomaly is observed, a list of potential 
root cause(s) will be provided to network engineers to assist decision-making, or to 
automated remediation or reasoning system. Then network engineers or the automated 
systems can place preventive measures or remediation accordingly as quickly as possible. 
As a result, the network will continue to operate without a down period. 
Thus, a goal of the solution presented herein is to identify preceding alarms, the 
parent in alert state (assume ANY stream can be the "parent"), and then child alarms that 
are a result of both the preceding and parent events. Further, after user confirmation, the 
entire sequence of state changes is a sequential pattern to be used with sequential pattern 
algorithms for real time predictions of the parent events and the effects they will have.  
Accordingly, this solution provides a novel method for capturing a sequential pattern of 
state changes for building future predictive models. 
Further, this solution is unique compared to classic causality inference tests, such 
as Granger causality or Sims causality. Consider Granger causality as one example. For 
example consider two time series streams: {x1, x2, . . ., xT} and {y1, y2, . . ., yT} in which 
x1, x2, . . ., xT-1 can be used to predict 'xT' and an error 'e1'.  Both information from 'x' 
and 'y' can be used to predict xT, essentially using {x1, x2, . . ., xT-1, y1, y2, . . ., yT-1} to 
predict xT and got an error e2. Now, if it is observed that e2< e1, then the joint feature of 
x and y is better at prediction xT than just using x feature alone, therefore y is effective for 
predicting x, so y and x have a causal relationship. This approach is straightforward but it 
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suffers from some drawbacks when compared with our machine learning approach of the 
solution provided herein.  
First, there are curses of dimensionality. The above example only has two 
dimensions. However, if the feature space is of a high dimension (which it will as there are 
many telemetry streams coming from each single device), then modeling and testing will 
be needed for n! (factorial of n) time considering every single combination. Secondly, the 
modeling approaches used in these classic approaches are mostly straight forward (linear 
functions or moment functions) which are not representative enough for cases discussed 
herein.   
For the machine learning (ML) approach described herein, the strength of the ML 
model can be leveraged and does not make any assumptions of the relationships between 
features and outputs. More importantly, the convolutional neural network (CNN) layer of 
this proposal is used as a middle layer to extract essential information from the original 
feature space, therefore the causality can be derived using these embedded essential 
information without having to explore all n! solution spaces. 
In summary, a novel machine learning approach is provide herein that learns the 
failure patterns of a device and uses this information to drive automatic root case 
identification. Anomalous events can be associated with potential root causes in order to 
build intellectual capital for training future predictive automated remediation systems. 
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